Abstract
The article offers the reassessment of the Mindanao peace process through the lens of justice and peace by analyzing the historical development of negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Focusing on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the Jeddah Accord of 1987, and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, the study argues that the persistent failure of genuine peace in Mindanao stems not from the absence of agreements but from the absence of justice-centered implementation. Drawing on structural violence theory, recognition theory, and negotiated peace theory, the article demonstrates how historical injustice, political misrecognition of Moro identity, and discontinuity in state commitment undermines peace outcomes. Central to this analysis are the documented statements and reports of Nur Misuari to the Organization of Islamic Conference now Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which reveals systematic state non-compliance and the erosion of trust in negotiated settlements. This article contributes to the literature by integrating historical analysis with justice-oriented theories. The article concludes that durable peace in Mindanao requires the fulfillment of earlier commitments, genuine political recognition, and the institutionalization of justice as the foundation of peace.
Keywords: Mindanao peace process, Justice and Peace, MNLF, GRP, Historical Injustice, Negotiated Peace
https://doi.org/10.65494/pinagpalapublishing.64